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I. Introduction 
It could be argued that tort law is failing, and arguably an example of this 
failure is the recent public liability and insurance (‘PL&I’) crisis. A number 
of solutions have been proposed, but ultimately the chosen solution should 
address whatever we take to be the cause of this failure. 
On one account, the PL&I crisis is a result of an unwarranted 
expansion of the scope of tort law. Proponents of this position sometimes 
argue that the duty of care owed by defendants to plaintiffs has expanded 
beyond reasonable levels, such that parties who were not really responsible 
for another’s misfortune are successfully sued, while those who really were 
to blame get away without taking any responsibility.1 However people 
should take responsibility for their actions, and the only likely consequence 
of allowing them to shirk it is that they and others will be less likely to 
exercise due care in the future, since the deterrents of liability and of no 
compensation for accidentally self-imposed losses will not be there. Others 
also argue that this expansion is not warranted because it is inappropriately 
fuelled by ‘deep pocket’ considerations rather than by considerations of 
fault. They argue that the presence of liability insurance sways the judiciary 
to award damages against defendants since they know that insurers, and not 
the defendant personally, will pay for it in the end anyway.2 But although it 
may seem that no real person has to bear these burdens when they are 
imposed onto insurers, in reality all of society bears them collectively when 
insurers are forced to hike their premiums to cover these increasing 
damages payments. In any case, it seems unfair to force insurers to cover 
                                                          
!  Department of Philosophy, University of Adelaide. 
1  See, eg, Greg Pynt, ‘Recent Developments in Liability Law — A Simple 
Plan’ (1999) 11 Insurance Law Journal 26. 
2  See Michael Mills for an in-depth exploration of this type of account. 
Michael Mills, ‘Insurance and Professional Liability — The Trend of 
Uncertainty Or: Negligence and the High Court — A Practitioner’s 
Perspective’ (2000) 12 Insurance Law Journal 25. Martin Davies also 
explores the role that liability insurance has played, and continues to play, in 
defining the concept of a duty of care, and in the practice of imposing 
liability on defendants. Martin Davies, ‘The End of the Affair: Duty of Care 
and Liability Insurance’ (1989) 9 Legal Studies 67. 
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these costs simply because they can afford to do so. If such an expansion is 
indeed the cause of the PL&I crisis, then a contraction of the scope of tort 
liability, and a pious return to the fault principle, might remedy the 
situation. 
However it could also be argued that inadequate deterrence is the 
cause of this crisis. On this account the problem would lie not with the tort 
system’s continued unwarranted expansion, but in the fact that defendants 
really have been too careless. If prospective injurers were appropriately 
deterred from engaging in unnecessarily risky activities, then fewer 
accidents would ever occur in the first place, and this would reduce the need 
for litigation at its very source. If we take this to be the cause of tort law’s 
failure then our solution should aim to improve deterrence. 
Glen Robinson has argued that improved deterrence could be 
achieved if plaintiffs were allowed to sue defendants for wrongful exposure 
to ongoing risks of future harm, even in the absence of currently 
materialized losses.3 He argues 
that at least in toxic injury type cases the tortious creation of risk 
[should be seen as] an appropriate basis of liability, with damages 
being assessed according to the value of the risk, as an alternative to 
forcing risk victims to abide the outcome of the event and seek 
damages only if and when harm materializes.4
In a sense, Robinson wishes to treat newly-acquired wrongful risks as de-
facto wrongful losses, and these are what would be compensated in liability 
for risk creation (‘LFRC’) cases. Robinson argues that if the extent of 
damages were fixed to the extent of risk exposure, all detected unreasonable 
risk creators would be forced to bear the costs of their activities, rather than 
                                                          
3  Glen Robinson, ‘Risk, Causation, and Harm’ in Christopher Morris and 
Raymond Frey (eds), Liability and Responsibility: Essays in Law and 
Morals (1991) 317. The significance of the word ‘ongoing’ is that Robinson 
does not want damages to be awarded for all wrongful risk exposures (eg 
once we know that the risk will not materialize into harm) but only when the 
risk of future harm is still an ongoing threat. Furthermore, such damages 
would not be intended to compensate, for example, for the cost of 
monitoring the plaintiff’s state of health after the risk exposure, or stress and 
anxiety resulting from knowledge that they may suffer some harm in the 
future, since these are actual losses and not mere risks. On this last point 
see, eg, Arthur Ripstein, ‘A Fair Division of Risks’ in Arthur Ripstein (ed), 
Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (1999) 48 (especially 75–7). 
4  Robinson, above n 3, 325. The sort of cases that Robinson’s liability for risk 
creation (‘LFRC’) would apply to might include exposure to asbestos, the 
anti-miscarriage drug diethylstilbestrol (‘DES’) which caused cancer in 
some daughters of the women who took it during pregnancy, silicone breast 
implants, crude oil spills, environmental contamination from toxic waste, 
and other relevantly similar cases. 
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only those who could be found responsible for another’s injuries ‘on the 
balance of probabilities’.5 The incidence of accidents should decrease as a 
result of improved deterrence, reduce the ‘suing fest’, and so resolve the 
PL&I crisis. So whilst the first solution involves contracting the scope of 
tort liability, Robinson’s solution involves an expansion of its scope. 
However Robinson acknowledges that LFRC seems prima-facie 
incompatible with current tort principles which in the least require the 
presence of plaintiff losses, defendant fault, and causation to be established 
before making defendants liable for plaintiffs’ compensation.6 Since losses 
would be absent in LFRC cases by definition, the first evidentiary 
requirement would always be frustrated, and in its absence proof of 
defendant fault and causation would also seem scant.7 If such an expansion 
of tort liability were not supported by current tort principles then it would 
be no better than proposals to switch accident law across to no-fault, since 
both solutions would require comprehensive legal reform.8 However 
Robinson argues that the above three evidentiary requirements could be met 
in LFRC cases to the same extent that they are met in other currently 
accepted cases, and hence that his solution would therefore be preferable to 
no-fault solutions as it would only require incremental but not 
comprehensive legal reform. 
Although I believe that actual losses should be present before 
allowing plaintiffs to seek compensation, I will not present a positive 
argument for this conclusion. My aim in this paper is not to debate the 
relative merits of Robinson’s solution as compared to no-fault solutions, nor 
to determine which account of the cause of the PL&I crisis is closer to the 
truth, but rather to find out whether Robinson’s solution would indeed 
require less radical legal reform than, for example, proposed no-fault 
solutions.9 I will argue that Robinson fails to show that current tort 
                                                          
5  See Scott Mann for an excellent discussion of some serious problems 
associated with reliance on standards of proof in tort law that make 
reference to the balance of probabilities. Scott Mann, ‘Science, Corporations 
and the Law’ (2001) 26 Alternative Law Journal 289. 
6  For brevity I shall refer to these as three evidentiary requirements of tort 
liability. 
7  What would a defendant be at fault for if nobody suffered a loss as a result 
of their conduct, and (more importantly) how could causation ever be 
established? 
8  Robinson, above n 3, 344–6. Robinson’s main reason for rejecting no-fault 
solutions is that they require ‘comprehensive’ tort law reform (and hence 
upheaval and uncertainty), and his aim is to offer an alternative that would 
only require ‘incremental’ reforms. 
9  I will take it for granted that a shift to no-fault would create upheaval and 
uncertainty. The question of whether the advantages of no-fault outweigh 
these disadvantages will not be addressed. 
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principles would support his proposed solution, and hence that his solution 
is at best on an even footing with no-fault solutions since both would 
require comprehensive legal reform. 
II. Robinson’s argument for LFRC from precedents 
Robinson uses two strategies to defend the legitimacy of expanding the 
scope of tort liability to include LFRC. His first strategy denies that current 
tort principles really do require the satisfaction of the first evidentiary 
requirement to justify imposing liability, and his second strategy argues 
that, contrary to initial appearances, the latter two requirements can in fact 
be met in LFRC cases. 
A. Proof of actual losses is not required to justify the imposition 
of liability 
Firstly, Robinson points out that when plaintiffs receive lump sum 
compensation payments, a portion of those damages is for anticipated future 
losses not for currently present losses. Lump sum payments inherently force 
us to make guesses about what future losses may eventuate, but the fact is 
that what is expected may never materialize. For example, plaintiffs may 
die prematurely for an unrelated reason, or on a more optimistic note they 
may recover; nevertheless this does not prevent us from awarding damages. 
So since the present tort system already compensates for non-existing but 
probable or expected losses, it could also compensate for probable losses in 
LFRC cases.10
Furthermore, Robinson also draws attention to lost chance cases 
which usually involve the following kind of scenario: 
At time t1 plaintiff (patient) had a chance of recovery from their 
malady. 
At time t2 defendant (doctor/surgeon) treats plaintiff for their malady. 
Because of the treatment, by the time t3 comes around, plaintiff no 
longer has that chance of recovery — they lost it as a result of the 
medical treatment. 
Judges award damages to plaintiffs for loss of their chance of 
recovery. 
Here Robinson argues that since ‘[t]ortious exposure to risk is ... the 
obverse of ... lost chance cases, and the problems of causal determination 
                                                          
10  Robinson, above n 3, 323–4. Also see Peter Cane’s discussion of the 
problems surrounding lump sum payments. Peter Cane, ‘Damages for 
Personal Injury and Death’ in Peter Cane (ed), Atiyah’s Accidents, 
Compensation and the Law (6th ed, 1999) 108. 
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and valuation are virtually identical’, that we should treat both cases alike.11 
If we are prepared to compensate people for the loss of a chance of 
something good, then we should also compensate those who gain a chance 
of something bad. Since both chances are equally tangible or intangible, and 
plaintiffs are already compensated for lost chances, they could also be 
compensated for newly acquired chances. Robinson concludes that contrary 
to initial appearances tort law does not require plaintiffs to sustain actual 
losses to warrant the imposition of liability, and hence that we should not 
suppose that LFRC is incompatible with current tort principles merely on 
account of the fact that plaintiffs would sue in the absence of having 
sustained materialized losses.12
B. Fault could be established in LFRC cases 
Secondly, Robinson points to the criterion of fault. He argues that a 
standard of care is breached not when a person causes a loss to another, but 
rather when they take unreasonable risks. Although judgments of fault are, 
of practical necessity, made after the occurrence of loss-causing events, the 
judgments themselves are not based on an ex-post but on an ex-ante 
perspective. Although ‘[t]he trier of fact may ... be aided by an ex post 
perspective[, t]hat perspective ... ought not to be used to distort the nature of 
the risk as it (should have) appeared to the parties ... at the time of its 
creation’.13 So on Robinson’s account, judgments of fault do not take into 
consideration the presence, extent or nature of losses suffered by plaintiffs, 
but they are made on grounds of the riskiness of that action — whether it 
was unreasonably risky or acceptably risky. This riskiness is present 
irrespective of whether losses actually eventuate, and so those who expose 
others to unreasonable risks are just as much at fault as those who do so but 
are also unfortunate enough to have caused losses. As long as defendants 
create unreasonable risk, they could rightfully be considered to have been at 
fault, and hence we can not suppose that defendant fault would be absent in 
LFRC cases. 
C. Causation could be established in LFRC cases 
Finally, Robinson argues that although it is usually assumed that ‘[t]ort law 
is deterministic in its view of causal relationships’, and thus that proof of 
causation requires evidence of a ‘fully determined ... relationship between 
                                                          
11  Robinson, above n 3, 324. 
12  Joseph King’s and Dov Apfel’s discussion suggests that they too would 
endorse Robinson’s analysis of the sort of reasoning that is used in lost 
chance cases. Joseph King, ‘Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal 
Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences’ 
(1981) 90 Yale Law Journal 1353. Dov Apfel, ‘Loss of Chance in 
Obstetrical Cases’ (1993) 29 Trial 48. 
13  Robinson, above n 3, 323. 
94 (2005) 30 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 
 
act and injury’,14 distinctively different types of reasoning and evidentiary 
standard were used to settle the issue of causation in the following cases: 
In Sindell [v Abbott Labs, 26 Cal 3d 588 (Cal, 1980)] plaintiff was 
injured by DES [diethylstilbestrol] taken by her mother but she 
could not establish the identity of the manufacturers that made the 
particular pills that caused the injury. The court held that liability 
should be apportioned among DES manufacturers in proportion to 
their share of the [DES] market. 
 ... 
In Summers [v Tice, 33 Cal 2d 80 (Cal, 1948)] plaintiff was injured 
by gunshot fired by one of two negligent hunters, but he could not 
prove which one fired the particular shot. The court held that he 
could recover against either or both hunters.15
In both cases there were a number of candidates, and for each 
candidate there was a certain probability (relative to our knowledge) that 
they had caused the plaintiff’s losses, and liability was apportioned on 
grounds of those probabilities. What this suggests, according to Robinson, 
is that to establish causation in tort law one need not provide evidence of a 
fully determined relationship between act and injury, but only to establish 
the probability that the said defendant caused the plaintiff’s loss.16 Thus 
given the way that the last evidentiary requirement was satisfied in these 
cases, Robinson argues that plaintiffs should also be allowed to use 
probabilistic reasoning and related probabilistic evidentiary standards to 
satisfy the third evidentiary requirement in LFRC cases. The last 
evidentiary requirement would only be difficult to satisfy in these cases if it 
could only be satisfied by the provision of deterministic evidence, but if 
probabilistic evidence were sufficient to establish causation then no such 
difficulty would arise in LFRC cases. Robinson concludes that plaintiffs 
should therefore be allowed to successfully sue defendants when it is only 
probable that the plaintiff will suffer a loss and not only when they have 
already suffered a tangible loss. 
III. Rejection of Robinson’s argument 
Robinson argued that radical tort law reform would not be required to 
justify the introduction of LFRC because such cases would be compatible 
with current tort principles. Specifically, he argued that although it may 
initially seem that current tort principles require the satisfaction of three 
evidentiary requirements to justify the imposition of liability onto 
                                                          
14  Ibid 317. 
15  Ibid 318, 319 n 5. 
16  I shall refer to the former as ‘deterministic evidence’ and the latter as 
‘probabilistic evidence’. 
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defendants — proof of plaintiff losses, defendant fault, and causation — 
and that these requirements could not be met in LFRC cases, that in actual 
fact the first requirement was not always met in current run of the mill cases 
anyway, and that the second and third requirements could be satisfactorily 
met in LFRC cases. I will now argue that, contrary to Robinson’s 
arguments, proof of defendant losses is present in lump sum payments and 
in lost chance cases, and that the reasoning used to establish causation in 
Sindell17 and Summers18 could not be used to establish causation in LFRC 
cases. Hence, irrespective of whether fault could be established in LFRC 
cases, the mere presence of fault in these cases would be insufficient to 
support Robinson’s preferred solution, rather than a no-fault solution, 
because fault is only a necessary condition for the justification of imposing 
liability. 
A. Competing accounts of lump sum payments and lost chance 
cases 
Robinson argued that if the first evidentiary requirement (ie the presence of 
losses) was indeed a precondition of imposing liability under the present 
tort system, then nobody should receive compensation unless they have 
already sustained actual losses. However he then presented an account of 
what goes on in lump sum payments and in lost chance cases, on which 
plaintiffs were compensated despite the absence of actual losses. On his 
account, these were both counter examples to the first evidentiary 
requirement because a large portion of lump sum payments is usually 
intended to cover not currently materialized losses but expected future 
losses, and because plaintiffs are compensated in lost chance cases not for 
the loss of anything tangible but for the loss of a probabilistic entity (ie a 
chance). Given that, on this account, the current tort system compensates 
people in the absence of actual losses, Robinson concluded that this could 
not be a precondition of imposing liability, and hence that plaintiffs should 
not have to establish the existence of actual losses in LFRC cases either. Let 
me now explain why Robinson’s account of these cases fails to show that 
the first evidentiary requirement is not a precondition of imposing liability 
under the present tort system. 
On orthodox accounts neither of these cases would lack actual losses. 
Calculating costs of losses does indeed require careful consideration of the 
cost of living with that loss into the future as well as what it has cost up to 
the present, but this only shows that proper estimation must take future 
costs into consideration. Although the element of expectation is required to 
make proper estimates of the full cost of sustaining and living with those 
losses, this cost attaches like a price tag to currently present losses and not 
                                                          
17  Sindell v Abbott Labs, 26 Cal 3d 588 (Cal, 1980) (‘Sindell’). 
18  Summers v Tice, 33 Cal 2d 80 (Cal, 1948) (‘Summers’). 
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to expected future losses. The difference between saying ‘X is the likely 
cost of this loss’ and ‘Y is the cost of likely losses’ is that in the former case 
X is the cost of a loss which does exist, whereas in the latter case Y is the 
cost of a loss that does not exist. Thus the difference between lump sum 
payments and LFRC cases is that lump sum payments compensate only for 
losses which currently exist, whereas LFRC cases would compensate for 
non-existent losses. 
Secondly, the reason why something real would have been lost on an 
orthodox account of what goes on in lost chance cases is best explained by 
use of an example. Imagine yourself in a room with four walls and a door in 
each wall. Each door is either locked or unlocked, and behind most doors 
are hungry lions with a taste for human blood whereas behind one door is a 
passage to safety, however you do not know which door leads to safety. 
Now if initially only three of the four doors (including the safety door) were 
open, but I flicked a switch and locked the safety door, then in effect I 
would have ensured that some grief would come to you once you attempt to 
leave the room. However if instead I unlocked the remaining door behind 
which another hungry lion sat, then although there would now be a greater 
risk that you would make the wrong choice and walk through the wrong 
door and be eaten by a hungry lion, we could not say that I would have 
made this result inevitable. 
By analogy, in lost chance cases a defendant’s real action has a very 
real consequence of wiping out all other avenues — of closing all safety 
doors — such that no matter what, the plaintiff will now never recover. 
Although we can never really know if recovery would have occurred had 
the doctor or surgeon not intervened, what we do know for certain is that 
avenues of recovery which were open before are now closed as a result of 
the treatment — we now know that recovery will never occur. To 
completely lose a chance of something good is very different to gaining a 
chance of something bad happening in the future. Something significant 
happens when a person loses their only chance of something positive 
happening, which does not happen when they gain a chance of something 
unwanted coming about. In a sense, it could be argued that a different form 
of causation is present in the former case which is not present in the latter 
case because in the former case the defendant’s action ensures that a loss 
will definitely occur, whereas in the latter case the defendant’s actions do 
not seal the plaintiff’s fate. What can be said, without getting entangled in 
the metaphysics of the difference in causation between these cases, is that 
real losses are present in lost chance cases because by losing an only chance 
of recovery it is not certain that mischief will come to the plaintiff, whereas 
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real losses would be absent in LFRC cases because to gain a chance of 
something bad happening does not make it certain that it will happen.19
Given that, on an orthodox account, actual losses were present in 
lump sum compensation and lost chance cases, are there any further reasons 
to prefer Robinson’s accounts on which actual losses were absent? If such 
reasons exist, then Robinson fails to provide them, and I am not inclined to 
look for them either. As accounts go, both seem initially plausible, however 
since one of these accounts is incompatible with the orthodoxy, in the 
absence of further argument Robinson’s accounts must be rejected. If 
Robinson wishes to tender his own accounts as counter examples to the 
claim that proof of actual losses is a precondition of imposing liability 
under the current tort system, then he must provide a better reason to prefer 
his account than its mere initial plausibility. Without such reasons 
Robinson’s argument fails. 
Hence, contrary to Robinson’s assertion, tort law does require proof 
of actual losses to justify the imposition of liability. Such proof exists in 
lump sum payments because payment is made for the cost of actual losses 
that are present at the time of the legal action. Such proof also exists in lost 
chance cases because to lose an only chance of recovery is very different 
from gaining a chance of something bad happening. In both of these 
examples actual losses are sustained, and hence these are not counter 
examples to the first evidentiary requirement of tort liability. 
B. The ontological status of risk ascriptions and wrongful 
losses 
Robinson claimed that causation was established in Summers and Sindell 
not by the provision of what I had called deterministic evidence, but by the 
use of probabilistic reasoning and probabilistic evidence, and hence he 
argued that such evidence should be accepted in LFRC cases as well. In this 
section I will argue that the so-called probabilistic reasoning that was used 
in these cases was substantially and relevantly different from the sort of 
reasoning that would be used in LFRC cases, and hence that Summers and 
Sindell do not support LFRC either. 
When Robinson says that Summers and Sindell both used 
probabilistic reasoning to establish causation, what he means is that a 
question mark hung above the cause of each of these losses to signify that 
although we knew that a loss was suffered in each case, we did not know 
who caused it. However the difference between these cases and LFRC cases 
is that in the latter the question mark would hang not above the defendant’s 
                                                          
19  Richard Posner also argues along these same lines. Richard Posner, ‘Lecture 
Two: The Common Law’ in Richard Posner (ed), Law and Legal Theory in 
England and America (1996) 39 (especially 49–50). 
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actions, but above the plaintiff’s losses to signify that we do not know if 
any losses will ever materialize. This difference is crucial because the 
presence of actual losses is epistemically advantageous in establishing 
causation. On the deterministic assumption that every effect must have a 
cause, if we can point to a loss then we can also say with certainty that 
something or someone must have caused it — that causation must have 
occurred. And although it may be difficult to determine who or what was 
the source of this causal agency, one thing that could not be doubted would 
be that causation had occurred. But how could causation ever be established 
in LFRC cases if evidence would be so thin in these cases that the effects 
could not even be pinned down? Whilst in Sindell and Summers the element 
of uncertainty attached to the attribution of causal agency to a particular 
party, in LFRC cases the element of uncertainty would attach to the very 
claim that causation had occurred, and this would make it particularly 
difficult for LFRC cases to meet the last evidentiary requirement. 
Nevertheless, Robinson might deny that question marks would hang 
above the effects in LFRC cases. For instance, he might argue that not only 
could we point to definite causal agents and their unreasonably risky 
behaviour in LFRC cases, but we could also point to definite effects, 
namely that the plaintiffs were now at risk (eg of developing cancer) 
whereas before they did not have those risks. So, far from being unable to 
point to definite effects, the effects in LFRC cases would be precisely the 
increased levels of risk now hanging over the plaintiffs. Given that no 
question marks would hang above either the causes or the effects in LFRC 
cases, it would in fact appear that causation could be established with 
greater ease and certainty in LFRC cases than it was in Summers and 
Sindell. 
Given Robinson’s treatment of risk ascription claims as claims about 
de-facto losses — as similar to ontological claims about actual losses — 
and given that so much hangs on whether this treatment is appropriate, it is 
important to ask what is meant by such claims. How should risk ascriptions 
be understood? 
The most charitable way to interpret risk ascriptions, given their 
alleged ontological equivalence with actual losses, would be to treat them as 
claims that are made true by facts about the physical state of the world — 
possibly by physical changes in the plaintiff’s body. The claim would be 
that when someone says, for example, ‘There is now a 20 percent risk that I 
will develop incurable cancer as a result of your exposing me to that 
radioactive plutonium’, that they would be saying something in the order of 
‘My body has undergone certain physical changes as a result of your 
exposing me to that radioactive plutonium, and 20 percent of people whose 
bodies undergo such changes also subsequently develop incurable cancer’. 
If risk ascriptions were interpreted in this manner then wouldn’t it be 
Compensation for Mere Exposure to Risk 99 
appropriate to treat risk exposures as de-facto losses — as ontological 
claims about physical changes that took place in the world as a result of the 
defendant’s actions, which are indeed on par with claims about actual 
losses? 
Although this interpretation of risk ascriptions does seem to warrant 
treating them as ontological claims, it fails to support Robinson’s argument 
in another respect. When it is suggested that tort principles require proof of 
causation, what is sought is not just proof that causation of any sort 
whatsoever had occurred, but rather we want proof that causation of 
something wrongful and hence compensable had taken place. If Sindell had 
established that her mother took DES during her pregnancy and that this led 
to some changes in her own body, but nobody thought those changes 
wrongful, then she would not have been compensated. If Summers had 
established that one of the defendants’ bullets caused some changes in him, 
but nobody thought those changes wrongful, then he too would not have 
been compensated. Thus similarly, if our fictitious character established that 
their exposure to plutonium led to some physical changes in their body, but 
they could not also show that those changes were actually wrongful, then 
they too should not be compensated for their risk exposure because we 
would not yet know if those changes were wrongful and hence 
compensable. Something that was implicit in Sindell and Summers was that 
the plaintiffs’ losses were actually wrongful, and this was why they were 
compensated. But if victims of risk exposures also want to be compensated 
then they must show explicitly that their exposure is actually wrongful too 
because this will not be immediately obvious. 
Since the wrongfulness of risk exposures attaches either to the 
eventual future outcome, or to the negligent nature of the defendant’s 
actions, risk exposure victims would face an uphill battle trying to show 
that their bodily changes were wrongful in themselves. To show that these 
changes were wrongful in themselves, risk-exposed parties would have to 
know for certain that the changes would lead to particularized harms, 
however this knowledge is precisely what they do not have. On the other 
hand, in pointing to defendants’ negligence, they would only show that 
defendants had done something wrong, and this would perhaps justify 
punishing the defendant, but they would not have shown that they had 
themselves suffered anything wrongful and hence compensable. At best 
such claims for compensation would be grounded in the defendant’s 
creation of uncertainty, but this would make risk ascriptions into epistemic 
claims, and these are not on par with ontological claims about actual losses. 
The charitable interpretation of risk ascriptions would therefore ultimately 
reduce to an epistemic claim about uncertainty, and this can not support 
Robinson’s argument because whilst the losses in Sindell and Summers 
were obviously wrongful and hence compensable, the de-facto losses in 
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LFRC cases would not be wrongful in themselves and hence they would not 
be compensable. 
The less charitable interpretation of risk ascriptions is to treat them as 
expressions of statistical probability which profess to make no ontological 
claim whatsoever — to treat them as expressions of epistemic uncertainty. 
On this interpretation the aforementioned utterance would be understood as 
saying something like ‘I have no idea whether your exposing me to that 
radioactive plutonium has actually had the slightest physical impact on me 
— for all I know it has not — but I know that in 20 percent of all cases of 
such exposure there are physical changes which invariably lead to the 
development of incurable cancer’. However given that this interpretation is 
essentially the same as what the charitable interpretation reduced to, I will 
conclude that it would not justify treating LFRC cases as similar to Sindell 
and Summers either. 
Thus irrespective of how risk ascriptions are interpreted, they will not 
bestow the same epistemic advantage in establishing causation as is 
bestowed by the presence of actual losses. The presence of effects 
establishes that causation must have occurred, and in their absence or when 
they are not visible it is not clear that causation took place. This means that 
the sort of probabilistic reasoning that was used in Sindell and Summers can 
not be used to establish causation in LFRC cases. 
C. Fault is not sufficient to justify the imposition of liability 
Finally, irrespective of whether I agree with Robinson’s claim that fault 
could be located in LFRC cases, the satisfaction of the second evidentiary 
requirement is only necessary, but not sufficient, to justify the imposition of 
liability onto defendants. Thus since the other two evidentiary requirements 
could not be satisfied in LFRC cases, this kind of expansion of tort liability 
would not be justified on the success of this argument alone. 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper began by arguing that until we reach some conclusion regarding 
what has caused tort law’s recent problems, we will have little basis for 
choosing between alternative solutions. If we take these problems to be 
caused by an unwarranted expansion of the scope of tort liability, then a 
contraction of its scope, and perhaps even a partial replacement of accident 
law with a no-fault scheme, might appear attractive. On the other hand, if 
we take these problems to be caused by inadequate deterrence, then 
Robinson’s LFRC solution might seem more appropriate. 
Robinson’s arguments for the compatibility of LFRC with current 
tort principles were then presented, and it was argued that unless they were 
successful then neither the no-fault nor the LFRC solution would be 
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preferrable on grounds of how much upheaval each would create, since both 
would require comprehensive tort law reform. 
I have argued that LFRC is incompatible with current tort principles, 
because irrespective of whether defendant fault could be established in 
LFRC cases, Robinson fails to show either that proof of actual losses is not 
required in current run of the mill tort cases, or that causation could be 
established in LFRC cases using the same sort of reasoning as is already 
used in other currently accepted cases. Thus, neither of these solutions is 
better than the other on account of how much upheaval and uncertainty it 
would create, since both would require comprehensive legal reform. 
